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Abstract:
This paper analyses the sources of business cycles in economies that have an important energy
producing sector. Especially, I investigate the effects of oil and gas extractions (energy booms) on the
manufacturing sector, and analyse whether there is any evidence of a "Dutch disease", that is whether
energy booms have had adverse effects on the manufacturing base. In additions to energy booms, I
identify three other types of disturbances in the economy; aggregate demand, supply and oil price
shocks. The different structural disturbances are identified by imposing long-run and short-run (zero)
restrictions on a vector autoregressive model. The analysis is applied to Norway and United Kingdom,
which both discovered huge oil resources in the North Sea in the 1970s. There is no evidence of a
Dutch disease in Norway, and manufacturing output has actually benefited from both energy
discoveries and higher oil prices. In UK on the other hand, manufacturing output has declined in
response to energy booms, although the effect is small compared to the effects of the other shocks
that are present at the time.
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3«A new paradigm emerged: of a country whose
wealth would henceforth be dependent on
services, on profits remitted from
overseas investment, and on North Sea oil.
Manufacturing was seen as a balancing item,
which, if temporary eclipsed by the impact of
oil, would automatically revive as oil
declined...» (Chandler 1994, p. 12)
1. Introduction
Recent empirical work has demonstrated that oil price increases have had adverse effects on several
industrial economies (e.g. Bruno and Sachs 1982, Darby 1982, Hamilton 1983, Burbidge and Harrison
1984 and Ferderer 1996). Especially, it is now believed that the two adverse oil price shocks in the
1970s reduced world manufacturing output drastically. The first major adverse oil price shock in
1973/1974 occurred at a time when both the British and the Norwegian economy had just discovered
huge oil resources in the North Sea. Most fields were not profitable before the mid 1970's, but the
prospect of increased oil revenues brought about by higher oil prices created a potential for profitable
output in both countries. By the end of the 1970's, Norway and UK had turned oil from an importable
to an exportable, so when the second oil price rise occurred in 1979/1980, overall national wealth
increased further in both countries. This may have confronted Norway and UK with a set of different
issues than the other OECD oil importing countries were facing.
First, the real oil price increase and the subsequent higher national wealth, raised income to the factors
of production including the government, so that overall demand and production in the economy may
actually have increased (although the effects on an exportable like manufacturing can be negative if
world demand for manufacturing falls as oil prices rise). Bjørnland (1996), has examined the effects of
oil price changes on GDP for some OECD countries including Norway and United Kingdom using a
vector autoregression (VAR) model, and essentially I found that for Norway, (non-oil) real output
actually increased in response to oil price increases, whereas UK behaved in line with the other oil
importing countries, where real output declined after an oil price shock.
Second, the stream of revenues from the North Sea also gave huge investment and business
opportunities to the economy, with increased demand for labour and capital. The adjustment period that
would follow was expected to affect the individual sectors in the economy to a varying degree. Some
sectors would gain, whereas others could actually loose out. This had been emphasised for the
Netherlands, where the natural gas discoveries in the 1960's were seen to have had adverse effects on
the Dutch manufacturing sector, mainly through a real exchange rate appreciation. The adverse effect
on the manufacturing sector from an energy boom, has been termed the 'Dutch disease' in the economic
literature. Similar contractions of the manufacturing sector have been observed in Norway and UK in
the 1970s and 1980s, a period of which these countries moved from positions as net importers to
significant net exporters of oil.
Much theoretical work has been carried out analysing the benefits and costs of energy discoveries, (see
e.g. Corden 1984, and the references he states). However, there has been relative few empirical studies,
and among those that have been carried out, most have been conducted through simulations of large
scale macroeconomic models. Previous empirical (simulation or simple quantification) studies
analysing the effects of energy booms on manufacturing production explicitly, include, e.g. Forsyth and
Key (1980), Bruno and Sachs (1982), Atkinson et al. (1983) and Bean (1987) about UK, and Bye et al.
(1994) and Cappelen et al. (1996) about Norway. Whereas Forsyth and Key (1980) and Bruno and
Sachs (1982) find some evidence of a Dutch disease, Atkinson et al. (1983), Bean (1987), Bye et al.
(1994) and Cappelen et al. (1996) find little or no evidence of a Dutch disease, and in some cases the
manufacturing sector has actually benefited from North Sea oil discoveries.
4The complexity of ways that energy shocks can influence the economy, motivates the use of a less
theoretical model like a vector autoregression model, instead of a fully specified large scale model,
(that is specified through a whole set of relations restrictions). An attempt in that direction is given by
Hutchison (1994), who uses a vector error correction model where he imposes cointegration
restrictions between the variables. The impulse response functions are thereafter found by assuming
exclusion restrictions that follow a recursive structure, as in Sims (1980) original work. Overall,
Hutchison (1994) finds no evidence of a Dutch disease in neither the Netherlands, Norway nor the UK,
and manufacturing has actually increased in response to oil and gas discoveries. However, the results in
Hutchison depend on the cointegration restrictions he has imposed, and for e.g. UK, he finds three
cointegration vectors. These vectors are not explicitly identified and the results from the cointegration
analysis are therefore not directly interpretable in economic terms. Further the recursive identification
structure used to identify the different shocks implies a causal ordering on how the system works, and
the results will typically be very sensitive to how identification was achieved.
Below, I instead analyse the effects of energy booms (volume changes due to e.g. a technical
improvement or a windfall discovery of new resources) in Norway and United Kingdom, using a
VAR model that is identified through both short and long run restrictions, that have intuitive theoretical
justifications. In addition to energy booms, I also identify real oil price shocks, to control for a possible
decline in manufacturing output induced by real factor price changes, as it occurred in many industrial
countries in the 1970s. Finally, I assume that there are demand and supply shocks present, that are
defined and distinguished from each other by imposing long run restrictions on the VAR model.
Especially, I interpret shocks that have permanent effects on output as supply shocks, whereas shocks
that have only temporary effects on output are interpreted as demand shocks. The long run restriction
used to identify supply and demand shocks, is similar to that employed by Blanchard and Quah (1989).
Essentially, I find no evidence of a Dutch disease in Norway, and both energy booms and oil price
increases stimulate the economy to the extent that manufacturing output increases (temporarily). For
UK, there is evidence of a Dutch disease in the long run (six to eight years), although the economy may
respond positively to energy booms the first couple of  years. However, the effects of energy booms in
UK are small compared to the effects of the other shocks present at the time.
The paper is organised as follows. In section two I present some indicators that summarise the
importance of the energy sector and the manufacturing sector in Norway and UK over the period
examined. Section three reviews the theory of Dutch disease, and thereafter present an economic
framework in which one can interpretate the four structural shocks; energy volume, energy price,
aggregate demand and aggregate supply shocks. In section four, I present the structural VAR model.
Section five reviews the effect of the different shocks on average for manufacturing output, prices and
unemployment, and the relative importance of the different shocks in accounting for the forecast errors
in the variables is assessed. In section six, the impacts of the different shocks on manufacturing output
are analysed in different historical periods. Especially, I decompose movements in manufacturing
output in each period as due to each of the four structural shocks. Section seven concludes1.
2. Oil and gas in the economy
Real output grew at a much faster rate in Norway than in most other OECD countries in the aftermath
of the oil price shocks in 1973/1974 and 1979/1980. Unemployment remained almost stable during the
1970s, a period where most countries experienced increasing unemployment. The discovery and use of
oil resources from 1970 onwards, stimulated the economy so it grew at a faster rate than otherwise
would have been possible. Especially, income from oil production was taken out in advance, and the
government followed an expansionary fiscal policy during many periods in the 1970s and early 1980s.
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 All calculations are performed using GAUSS and RATS, unless otherwise stated.
5The macroeconomic performance of the British economy has been less prosperous the last three
decades. The 1970s was characterised by increasing inflation rates, which was followed by record high
unemployment rates in the 1980s. Although the economy was a net exporter of oil by the time the
second oil price shock occurred in 1979, the economy was not stimulated by the prospects of increased
oil revenues to any extent as the Norwegian economy experienced. Instead, the record high inflation
rates led the government to adopt tight monetary policy from the late 1970s, and tight fiscal policies
from the early 1980s.
In both Norway and UK, manufacturing production were stagnant or fell during many periods in the
1970s and early 1980s (for a plot of manufacturing, see e.g. figures 9D and 10D). With positive growth
rates in the overall economy, the share of manufacturing in GDP has fallen, and from 1973 to 1993,
manufacturing as a pct. of GDP has declined by about 1/3 in both countries (cf. table 1).
Table 1. Oil and manufacturing production (value added) as pct. of GDP, constant prices
1973 1976 1980 1985 1990 1993
Norway
Oil and gas 0.4 3.2 8.9 9.0 15.4 20.3
Manufacturing 23.1 22.0 19.5 17.8 17.0 16.6
UK
Oil and gas 0.1 0.1 4.4 6.1 1.7 2.1
Manufacturing 31.6 30.1 26.6 23.5 23.7 22.7
Sources: Statistics Norway, Kvarts Database; UK Central Statistical office, National Accounts, various issues.
Oil and gas production has increased its importance in both countries during the same period as
manufacturing output has declined as a share of GDP (for a plot of oil and gas production, see
appendix A). From virtually zero production in the early seventies, UK produced 4.5 pct. of the total
world production of oil in 1985, whereas Norway was responsible for 1.5 pct. of total world production
of oil the same year. The picture had turned around by the start of the 1990s, and by 1993, 3.2 pct. of
total world production of oil was produced by UK whereas Norway was responsible for 3.6 of  total
world production of oil. However, with Norway being a much smaller economy than UK, the relative
importance of oil and gas has been largest in the Norwegian economy, where the oil and gas sector now
amounts to more than 20 pct. of GDP (1993). The share of oil and gas extraction in UK reached a peak
in 1984/1985 when it accounted for approximately 6 pct. of GDP. Since then it has fallen, and in 1993,
the share of energy production was just above 2 pct. of GDP.
3. Economic effects of North Sea Oil
The harmful consequence for traditional industries of a natural resource discovery, has commonly been
referred to as the Dutch disease in the economic literature (cf. Rutherford 1992). One of the symptoms
of the «disease» is high unemployment rates. This had been experienced in the Netherlands, where the
rapid growth of the new gas industries in the 1960s, had led to an overall change in the industry
structure. Especially, with the prosperous new gas industry, the exchange rate appreciated, with the
consequence that the traditional industries became internationally uncompetitive and declined. This
became clearly visible by the end of the 1970s, when the high income from the gas resources declined.
By then, the (uncompetitive) traditional industries could not compensate for the loss of revenues from
the energy sectors, and the following years, output growth was low and unemployment rose quickly
and has remained relatively high since then.
A large amount of theoretical literature analysing the macroeconomic impacts of a natural (energy)
resource discovery has been developed, for instance Eide (1973), Forsyth and Key (1980), Bruno and
Sachs (1982), Corden and Neary (1982), Eastwood and Venables (1982), Corden (1984) and Neary and
Van Wijnbergen (1984). One of the first known studies of the de-industrialisation effect of a natural
6resource discovery, was applied to Norway, by Eide (1973). In this study, Eide analyses the effects of
the use of oil revenues by the government, either through a reduction in taxes or through increased
government spendings. He uses a comparative static model, and concludes that the use of oil revenues
will increase prices in the non traded goods and service sector, and induce a change in the overall
industry structure, away from the traded goods sector and towards the non traded goods and service
sector.
In Eide (1973), there is only an indirect de-industrialisation effect following the oil discoveries, as all
reallocations are brought about by the real appreciation, which is induced by the increased government
spendings2. Corden and Neary (1982) have developed a model where both the direct and the indirect
de-industrialisation effect is taken into account. The direct impact of oil and gas resources (or any other
sectoral boom) come through an increased demand for resources and goods and services to the energy
producing sector. This is usually referred to as a the Resource Movement Effect. The increased demand
for goods and services by the energy sector will lead to an indirect (secondary) effect of increased
demand for resources by the sectors that will produce goods and services for the energy sector. If
income in the energy sector has increased, there will also be a further (indirect) effect of increased
demand for goods and services. These indirect effects are usually described as the Spending Effects,
and will lead to a real appreciation that will hurt some sectors and benefit others.
More formally, Corden and Neary (1982), assume that there are three sectors in the economy, a
booming sector (B), a tradeable sector (producing primarily manufacturing goods) (T) and a non-
tradeable sector (N). The first two sectors produce tradeables given world prices, whereas prices for
non-tradeables are given by domestic factors. The energy boom is understood as an exogenous
technical improvement in B. The resource movement effect will increase demand for labour in B, as the
marginal product of labour in B raises from the boom, given constant wages in terms of the tradeables.
Hence, there will be a movement of labour out of T and N, into B. The movement of labour from T to
B will lower output in T directly, whereas the movement of labour from N to B at constant prices, will
reduce the supply of N and create an excess demand for N . In response to the excess demand of N, the
price for N in terms of T will raise, which will give a real appreciation and further movements of
resources out of T into N.
Second, aggregate income of the factors initially employed in the booming sectors will rise. This will
lead to a spending effect, directly by the factor owners in B or indirectly by the government that
collects (part of) the income through taxes. With positive income elasticity of demand for N, the price
of N relative to the price of T must rise, giving a further real appreciation. Given full employment of all
resources, this real appreciation will induce additional movement of labours from T to N. Finally, both
the spending effect and the resource movement effect will lower the real rents of the specific factor in
T. However, both effects will also increase the demand for labour in the economy, thus raising the
nominal wage rate (in terms of tradeables) and reducing the competitiveness of T.
The (core) model described above can be varied in a number of ways. Cordon (1984), summarises
several examples of how one can alter the model so the outcome described above may change
substantially. Here, I will only focus on a few examples. In the above framework, I assumed that labour
was mobile between the three sectors (but there was no capital mobility). By allowing all factors to be
mobile, the effects of an energy boom may be ambiguous, and output in the manufacturing sector may
or may not fall. A situation where output in the manufacturing industry may actually increase would be
when one assume that B has its own specific factor, labour is mobile between the three sectors but
capital is mobile only between the N and T sector. This makes up a miniature Heckscher-Ohlin
economy, where one sector will be labour intensive whereas the other will be capital intensive. In this
case, the resource movement effect will cause the output of the capital intensive industry to expand (as
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 The increase in the relative prices of non traded goods in terms of traded (manufacturing) goods is equal to a real exchange rate
appreciation if the terms of trade in manufacturing is fixed, which is a plausible small country assumption.
7labour is moving out of the labour intensive industry and into B during the boom). If T is the capital
intensive industry, and the  (negative) spending effect on output in the T sector is smaller than the
resource movement effects, output in the T sector may actually increase.
Another realistic alteration of the core model is to assume that capital is internationally mobile,
(although it is not mobile intersectorally). Assume the rents in B and N rise (as output rises) while the
rent in T falls. International capital mobility will induce a flow of capital into B and N, and out of T.
This will reduce output in T further, but the effects on the returns to capital in the three sectors will be
dampened due to the capital outflow until eventually, a new equilibrium is restored. Although the fall
in output in T will be more severe, the adverse effect of the boom on profitability in T will be less due
to the capital outflow. In the extreme case of perfect international capital mobility, the rate of return in
T will not fall at all, and the price and the rate of profit in T will be fixed internationally. With constant
returns to scale in the production technologies, the wage in terms of T will also remain fixed and all
adjustments will come through output changes. One can show that in the case of perfect international
capital mobility, there will be no real appreciation effect.
Up to now, I have assumed that all factor prices are flexible, so there is no involuntary unemployment.
In a situation when there is real wage resistance (and classical unemployment), the effect on
unemployment may be ambiguous. Generally, if the energy boom has increased the real wage in the
core model, then with a rigid real wage rate, unemployment would have been reduced instead.
However, if the energy boom has reduced the real wage in the core model, then with a rigid real wage,
unemployment would actually increase. This explains why the typical symptom of a Dutch disease
manifests itself in unemployment in the tradeable sector (as it did in the Netherlands in the late 1970s).
If the real wage was flexible it would fall in the tradeable sector, (as there is both movement of labour
out of T and into other sectors, and the price of N rises). With real wage resistance, the result would
instead be increasing unemployment rates. If the labour force in T in addition seek to maintain real
wages relative to those employed in the booming sector (where market forces have raised the real
wage), unemployment would be further intensified.
On the other hand, if one is initially in a situation where all domestic resources are not fully employed
before the energy boom, the boom may actually provide a stimulative effect on the industries. This
typically happened in Norway, where the growth in the public sector in the 1970s provided a stimulus
to the female employment opportunities.
To sum up, the core model predicts that the manufacturing sector eventually will contract as the energy
sector expands. However, there are several ways the core model may be altered (by changing the
underlying assumptions) so that the predicted effects of energy booms on the manufacturing sector may
be less severe than in the basic case, and in some cases there may not be a Dutch disease at all. The
main focus of this paper, will be to examine empirically through a structural VAR model, if there are
any lasting negative effects of energy volume changes (energy booms) on manufacturing output. It is
through this effect I will be able to assess the relevance of the Dutch disease hypothesis. To control for
other types of shocks that are also present, I will in addition identify real oil price shocks, aggregate
demand shocks and aggregate supply shocks, that are uncorrelated with each other and the energy
volume shocks. The interpretation of these structural shocks in the VAR analysis, will be motivated by
a simple economic model of output fluctuations as discussed below.
3.1. Energy price, demand and supply shocks
In addition to the effects of energy booms discussed above, energy price shocks may also have separate
and complex effects on the economy. An energy price disturbance can typically have both demand and
supply effects on real output (see e.g. Mork 1994). For instance, the two adverse oil price shocks in the
1970s are believed to have reduced world manufacturing output drastically, mainly by reducing the net
amount of energy used in the production. This may have hurt manufacturing in the oil exporting
8countries as well as in the oil importing countries. In addition, aggregate demand may also have
changed, by transferring income from the oil importing countries to the oil exporting countries, thus
inducing the rational consumers in the oil importing countries to hold back on their consumption
spendings. On the other hand, the increase in income in the oil exporting countries will increase
demand for goods and services domestically as well as from the oil importing countries, thus reducing
the net effect of an oil price increase in the world.
In Bjørnland (1996), I proposed a simple economic model where energy price shocks may affect the
aggregate economy through several channels. In addition to energy price shocks, I assumed that there
were other demand and supply shocks that also hit the economy. The model was a variant of a simple
(Keynesian) model of output fluctuations adopted from Blanchard and Quah (1989), which consisted of
an aggregate demand function, a production function, a price setting behaviour and a wage setting
behaviour. The model was modified by including real oil prices into the system, primarily into the
aggregate demand function and the production function. Solving for the level of output, I found that
whereas supply and oil price shocks will affect output in the long run (through the production
function), demand shocks will have no long run effects on output. However, in the short run, due to
nominal and real rigidities, all three disturbances can influence output.
The finding that aggregate demand shocks have only short term effects on output, is also consistent
with the interpretation of an upward sloping short run supply schedule, but a vertical long run supply
schedule in the price-output space. A positive demand shock (e.g. a monetary expansion) will shift up
the (downward sloping) aggregate demand (AD) curve, increasing both output and price. In the long
run, the aggregate supply (AS) curve becomes more vertical, hence the economy moves back to its
initial output level, where prices have increased to a permanent higher level. However, the speed of
adjustment to a demand shock is unrestricted and may be instantaneous (as in the New Classical
School) or slow (as in the Keynesian models with a relatively flat short run supply schedule)3. The
AD/AS framework can also be used to study supply shocks like technology or factor price shocks. For
instance, a positive supply shock (e.g. a technological improvement) that shifts both the short run and
long run AS schedule to the right, will increase output and reduce prices permanently, whereas
following a permanent negative oil price shocks, the reverse will be true.
Although demand and supply shocks can be identified in the price-output space above, a model
comprising output and unemployment may essentially contain the same information on the shocks on
which we are interested to study. Typically, a positive demand shock that increases output temporarily
along the short run supply schedule (where prices increase), will induce a temporary fall in the
unemployment rate. However, over time, when the economy has adjusted to the higher prices, the short
run supply schedule shifts backwards to its long run equilibrium, consistent with a natural rate of
unemployment.
4. Examining the relevance of the Dutch Disease, through a
Structural VAR
Analysis of the linkages between energy and the economy is complicated, and it is difficult to capture
all the channels of influence without a fully specified model. In a seminal article, Sims (1980)
proposed to use VARs as an alternative to the traditional structural econometric models, where too
many parameters were identified by excluding variables, most often lagged endogenous variables,
without proper theoretical justifications. Sims suggested instead to limit the role of theory to give a set
of assumptions necessary to identify the residuals in the VAR model, with shocks in a series of
structural models. In Sims’ original work, the system was identified recursively. Here I will show how I
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9instead can use a combination of short run and long run restrictions on a VAR model, to identify
different types of structural shocks.
I first specify a VAR model that focuses on four variables; manufacturing output, oil and gas
production (extraction), real oil prices and inflation. These variables are a minimum of variables
chosen so that they shall capture all the information necessary to identify the four structural shocks
defined above; energy volume shocks (energy booms), real oil prices, aggregate demand, and
aggregate supply shocks.
Energy booms and oil price shocks will be identified by imposing a minimum of contemporaneous
restrictions on the equation for energy production and real oil prices respectively. Each of these
restrictions will be discussed below. As energy booms are identified from the equation for energy
extractions, they will be interpreted as volume changes (due to e.g. a technical improvement or a
windfall discovery of new resources). Hence, they reflect shocks to a nations income (or wealth).
Another aspect of the Dutch Disease would be to analyse the (direct) demand effects from the energy
sector explicitly. This is done in simulation studies like Cappelen et al. (1996), where energy booms
are identified as changes in investment demand from the petroleum sector. Although these two
approaches measure different aspects of the economy (shock to a nations wealth versus demand
impulses), I will show by the end of this paper that using either way to identify energy booms in
Norway, essentially gives the same results.
To identify demand and supply shocks, I include manufacturing output and inflation in the VAR, so
that I can make use of a long run restriction motivated by the findings in the AD/AS analysis above,
namely that aggregate demand shocks can have no long run effects on manufacturing output. This
restriction is also similar to that applied in Blanchard and Quah (1989) and Bayoumi and Eichengreen
(1992). However, whereas Blanchard and Quah (1989) used a bivariate VAR model comprising the
first differences of output and the (detrended) unemployment rate to identify demand (transitory)
shocks and supply (permanent) shocks, Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1992) estimated a bivariate VAR in
the first differences of output and the inflation rate (assuming inflation is stationary), to identify the
same shocks4. As discussed in section 3.2, these two models essentially contain the same information
on the demand and supply shocks5. To analyse the robustness of the results, I will therefore also
estimate a VAR model where I replace inflation with unemployment. I will refer to the output-inflation
(Y-π) model as the core model, whereas the model replacing inflation with unemployment is referred to
as the output-unemployment (Y-U) model. However, in contrast to Blanchard and Quah (1989) and
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1992) who only identified one type of permanent shock (aggregate supply),
I will also allow energy volume and price shocks to affect output in the long run.
4.1. Identifying the Structural VAR
Manufacturing output, oil and gas production and real oil prices are nonstationary integrated, I(1),
variables, where stationarity is obtained by taking first differences. Inflation and unemployment are
assumed to be stationary, I(0), variables. First, I define zt as a vector of stationary macroeconomic
variables zt = (∆yt, ∆ot, ∆st, πt)', where ∆yt  represents the first differences of the log of manufacturing
production, ∆ot  is the first differences of the log of real oil prices, ∆st  is the first differences of the log
of oil and gas extraction and πt  (=∆pt ) is the inflation rate6. Although the analysis below refers to the
core model, it is equally applicable to the Y-U model, as both inflation and unemployment are assumed
to be stationary. Formally, the reduced form VAR is estimated as:
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A(L) is the matrix lag operator and A0 = I is the identity matrix. The residual vector et is serially
uncorrelated with covariance matrix Ω. As the VAR contains only stationary variables, it is itself
stationary and the Wold Representation Theorem implies that under weak regularity conditions a
stationary process can be represented as an invertible distributed lag of serially uncorrelated
disturbances. The implied MA representation from (1) can then be found and written as (ignoring the
constant term hereafter):
(2)
z e C e C e
z C L e
t t t t
t t
= + + +
=
− −1 1 2 2 ...
( )
where C(L)=A(L)-1. The Cj matrix refers to the moving average coefficient at lag j and C0 is the identity
matrix. As the elements in et are contemporaneously correlated, they can not be interpreted as structural
shocks. The elements in et are orthogonalized by imposing restrictions. A (restricted) form of the
moving average containing the vector of original disturbances as linear combinations of the Wold
innovations can be expressed as:
(3)
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where εt are orthogonal structural disturbances which for convenience I normalise so they all have unit
variance, e.g. cov(εt)=I. The assumption that the underlying structural disturbances are linear
combinations of the Wold innovations (et) is essential, as without it the economic interpretations of
certain VAR models may change, see e.g. Lippo and Reichlin (1993) and Blanchard and Quah (1993)
for a discussion of the problem of nonfundamentalness. With C0 as the identity matrix, from (2) and
(3), I can write et =D0 εt. Substituting this expression into (2), I find Dj =CjD0 , or:
(4) C L D D L( ) ( )0 =
The coefficients in the C(L) polynomial can be calculated from the inverse of the A(L) polynomial, that
is estimated in (1). If D0 is identified, I can derive the MA representation in (3). To identify D0, I will
first make use of the fact that from the normalisation of cov(εt) it follows that:
(5) D D0 0 ' = Ω
With a four variable system, this imposes ten restrictions on the elements in D0. However, as the D0
matrix contains sixteen elements, to orthogonalise the different innovations, six more restrictions are
needed. One will come from a restriction on the long run multipliers of the D(L) matrix, whereas the
other five will come from restrictions on the contemporaneous matrix, D0 directly. I first order the four
uncorrelated structural shocks as εt = (εt AD, εtOP, εtES, εtAS)', where εtAD  is the aggregate demand shock,
εt 
OP
  is the oil price shocks, εtES  is the energy boom and εtAS  is the aggregate supply shock. From (3),
the effect of a demand shock (εtAD ) on ∆yt after j periods can be written as; D11, j, whereas the effect of
a demand shocks on (the level of) yt after k periods is; D jj
k
110 ,=∑ . Hence, the long run effect of the
aggregate demand shock upon the level of yt is simply found by summing the infinite number of lag
coefficients D jj 110 ,=
∞∑ . From (4), the long run expression can be written as: C D Djj jj=∞ =∞∑ ∑=0 0 0
or:
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where C C jj( )1 0= =
∞∑  and D D jj( )1 0= =∞∑  indicate the long run matrixes of C(L) and D(L)
respectively. C(1) is observable, found by inversion of  A(1). The long run identification then implies
that D11 (1)= 0, (see also Bjørnland 1996). Hence:
(7) C D C D C D C D11 11 0 12 21 0 13 31 0 14 41 01 1 1 1 0( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), , , ,+ + + =
In the four variable system, five more restrictions are required to identify the system. These are found
through contemporaneous restrictions on real oil prices and energy production. In Bjørnland (1996), oil
price shocks were identified by assuming that the contemporaneous effects of demand and supply
shocks on real oil prices were zero. This is reasonable as oil prices have been dominated by a few large
exogenous developments, (e.g. the OPEC embargo in 1973, the Iranian revolution in 1978/1979, the
Iran-Iraq War in 1980/1981, the collapse of OPEC in 1986, and most recently the Persian Gulf War in
1990/1991). The oil price is a financial spot price that reacts quickly to news. I therefore assume that if
demand shocks and supply shocks influence real oil prices, they do so with a lag. In addition I also
assume that energy booms will affect real oil prices with a lag, as both Norway and UK have been
relatively small oil producers compared to the rest of the worlds major producers. However, after a
period (one quarter), all three shocks are free to influence real oil prices. The three short term
restrictions on real oil prices then imply that:
(8) D D D21 0 23,0 24 0 0, ,= = =
The final two restrictions are found by assuming that the contemporaneous effects of aggregate demand
and aggregate supply disturbances on extraction of oil and gas are zero. However, I allow oil price
shocks to have a contemporaneous effect on oil production, so that the oil producer can determine
whether to take out energy production now, or hold back on oil and gas extractions as the price of
energy varies. As above, after a period (one quarter), all shocks are free to influence energy production.
(9) D D31 0 34 0 0, ,= =
The system is now just identifiable. It turns out to be linear in its equations and can be solved
numerically. By using a minimum of restrictions I have been able to disentangle movements in four
endogenous variables; manufacturing output, oil and gas extractions, real oil prices and inflation
(unemployment) into parts that are due to four structural shocks; aggregate demand, supply, oil price
and energy (volume) booms. Note that I have not imposed any long run restriction on the behaviour of
output to energy booms. This is obvious, at as it is through the long run behaviour of manufacturing
output to an energy boom that I can assess the evidence of a Dutch disease.
Despite the many advantages of using structural VARs, it is also subject to some limitations.
Especially, it is recognised that the results from using a VAR model will be sensitive to the way the
model is identified. The identifying restrictions should therefore have plausible interpretations and the
credibility of the results could be tested, using for instance any overidentifying restrictions. For
instance, demand and supply shocks are identified and distinguished by assuming that only the latter
have a permanent effect on output. For these results to be plausible, the simultaneous effects on
inflation and prices (or unemployment) should be established. Especially, from the AD/AS analysis
above we saw that whereas a positive demand shock shall increase prices permanently, following a
positive supply shocks, prices shall fall permanently. This suggests two overidentifying restrictions on
prices, which can be tested informally by examining the impulse response analysis below.
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Finally, the limited number of variables and the aggregate nature of the shocks, implies that I will not
be able to distinguish between different aggregate demand shocks (e.g. increases in money supply or
government consumption) and aggregate supply shocks (labour supply and technical improvements).
However, by isolating oil prices and energy booms, I have at least separated oil price shocks and
energy volume booms (which among other have labour supply effects) from the other supply shocks.
5. Model specifications and empirical results
The VAR model specified above was assumed to be stationary, and the levels of the variables were not
cointegrating. Below I perform some preliminary data analysis, to verify whether I have specified the
variables according to their time series properties. Several misspecification tests are also carried out.
The dynamic effects of the different shocks on the variables are thereafter estimated.
5.1. Data and model specifications
The data used in the core model for both countries are the first differences of the log of manufacturing
production, the first differences of the log of oil and gas extraction, the first differences of the log of
real oil prices and the inflation rate measured as the first differences of the log of the GDP deflator.
Real oil prices are defined as the nominal oil prices in US dollars converted to their national currency
and deflated by the consumer price index. I use the consumer price index to deflate oil prices, as in oil
producing countries, oil prices may be included in the GDP deflator, (especially in Norway where
approximately 20 pct. of GDP is generated in the oil sector). Inflation is measured by the GDP deflator,
as I assume the GDP deflator reflects prices of output rather than prices of consumption (see e.g.
Bayoumi and Eichengreen 1992). Note that for Norway I use the GDP deflator for the mainland
economy, to avoid that oil prices are included in prices. The data are quarterly, seasonally adjusted, and
the sample runs from 1976Q1 to 1994Q3 for both countries, to be consistent. The data and their
sources are described further in appendix A.
The lag order of the VAR-models are determined using the Schwarz (SC) and Hannan-Quinn (HQ)
information criteria and the F-forms of likelihood ratio tests for model reductions as suggested by
Doornik and Hendry (1994). Lag lengths between one and eight order are considered. I report two
different types of F-tests, one where I reduce the order of the VAR model sequentially and one where
the order of the VAR is reduced directly. To investigate whether the models selected are correctly
specified, I finally apply a set of misspecification tests.
An initial set of lag reduction tests suggested that a model reduction to three lags could be accepted in
Norway and UK at the 1 pct. level7. With three lags in the model for Norway, I could reject the
hypothesis of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity at the 5 pct. level for all variables. For UK, four
lags were required to reject the hypothesis of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity at the 5 pct. level.
However, using three lags in Norway and (three or) four lags in UK, I could not  reject the hypothesis
of normality in the equations for ∆ot in both countries and in the equation for ∆st in Norway even at the
1 pct. level.
To take care of the non-normality in the equations for ∆ot, two dummies are specified. The first dummy
is one in 1986Q1 (D86Q1), corresponding to the collapse of OPEC behaviour and the second dummy is
one in 1990Q3 (D90Q3), which is the huge increase in oil prices corresponding to the Gulf War. The
non-normality in the equation for ∆st for Norway seems to stem from the exceptionally high growth
rates in the late 1977 and early 1978 in oil and gas extractions. I therefore also include a dummy that is
                                                     
7
 The SC and HQ information criteria are minimised using one lag in both Norway and UK. To avoid a large number of lags, I
use the 1 pct. level as a criteria to select the number of lags using the F-tests.
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one in 1977Q4 and 1978Q1 (DD77Q4) for Norway. The dummies will be included in all equations in
the VAR models8.
A new set of lag reduction tests, using the three dummies D86Q1, D90Q3 and DD77Q4 for Norway
and the two dummies D86Q1, D90Q3 for UK, confirm that a model reduction from eight to three lags
in Norway and eight to four lags in UK, can still be accepted at the 1 pct. level. These test results are
seen in table B.1 and B.2 in appendix B. Misspecification tests again suggest that there is no evidence
of serial correlations or heteroscedasticity in the residuals in any of the two countries. Non-normality
tests can now also be rejected at the 10 pct. levels in both countries. The misspecification tests are seen
in table B.3 and B.4.
Inflation is taken to be stationary I(0) in the analysis, whereas manufacturing production, oil and gas
extractions and real oil prices are taken to be nonstationary integrated I(1) variables. To test whether
the time series properties correspond to these assumptions, I use the augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF)
test for unit roots. In neither Norway nor UK can I reject the hypothesis that manufacturing production,
oil and gas extractions, real oil prices and prices are I(1). Further, I can reject the hypothesis that
manufacturing production, oil and gas extractions, real oil prices and prices are I(2). Hence, ∆yt, ∆ot,
∆st and πt, are stationary variables over the sample. In the VAR model specified above, there are no
cointegration relations. Using the maximum likelihood estimation procedure advocated by Johansen
(1988, 1991), I can confirm that the level of manufacturing production, oil and gas production, real oil
prices and inflation (yt, ot, st, πt) are not cointegrated9. Hence, the VAR model is well specified as
described in section four. The results from the unit root and cointegrating tests are seen in table C.1 and
C.2 in appendix C.
Finally, in the Y-U model I replace inflation with unemployment (again see appendix A for sources). I
use three and four lags for Norway and UK respectively to be consistent with the core model. The same
dummies that are used in the core model are also included here. Unemployment is treated as stationary
in the analysis. However, in Bjørnland (1996), unemployment was found to be stationary only when I
had allowed for a structural break in the trend in 1980Q2 for UK, and in 1988Q2 for Norway. I
therefore detrend the data and remove the structural break prior to estimation using the break point in
1980 for UK and 1988 for Norway. Finally, a set of cointegrating tests confirmed that the system is not
cointegrating. These results are reported in appendix C.310.
5.2. Dynamic Responses in the output-inflation (core) model
The cumulative dynamic effects (calculated from equation 3) of energy booms, oil price shocks,
demand shocks and supply shocks on the level of manufacturing production and the level of the GDP
deflator in Norway are reported in figures 1 and 2 respectively, whereas the cumulative dynamic effects
of the same shocks on the level of manufacturing production and the GDP deflator in UK are reported
in figure 3 and 4 respectively. The figures give the responses to each shock, with a one standard
deviation band around the point estimates, reflecting uncertainty of estimated coefficients11. The
horizontal axis indicates time in quarters, whereas the vertical axis denotes percentage change.
                                                     
8
 However, as will be discussed later, the results will not be very sensitive to the inclusion of these dummies.
9
 Note that inflation is treated as a stationary variable in the core model, (as unemployment is in the Y-U model), so that when
testing for cointegration relations, I use inflation together with the level of manufacturing, energy production and oil prices.
10
 Note that, strictly speaking, the assumptions that πt and  ut are stationary, nevertheless implies that I should have found one
(trivial) cointegrating vector, namely that which has zero coefficients on all variables, except on the stationary variable where it
has one, (0,0,0,1). The failure to find this cointegration vector, may be due to the low power of the tests.
11
 The standard errors reported are calculated using Monte Carlo simulation based on normal random drawings from the
distribution of the reduced form VAR. The draws are made directly from the posterior distribution of the VAR coefficients, as
suggested in the RATS manual. The standard errors that correspond to the distributions in the D(L) matrix are then calculated
using the estimate of D0.
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Figure 1. Cumulative impulse response function: Norway Manufacturing Production
A) Energy Booms B) Real Oil Price Shock
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Figure 2. Cumulative impulse response function: Norway price (GDP Deflator)
A) Energy Booms B) Real Oil Price Shock
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Figure 1 shows that manufacturing production in Norway actually increases in response to a (one unit)
energy boom. Similarly, oil price shocks also increase output, and after two years, both shocks have
increased manufacturing output with approximately 0.2 pct. However, the wide standard error bands
indicate that the response to both types of shocks is not precisely estimated. Nevertheless, the response
of output to these two energy shocks indicate that both energy volume and price shocks may actually
have benefited the manufacturing sector in Norway, through e.g. increased demand for domestic
manufacturing output to the energy sector or through subsidies towards industries (financed by the
higher income from the oil sector). Especially, an extensive subsidy programme towards exposed
industries was introduced in Norway in the late seventies, to help competitive industries through the
international recession, (see e.g. Cappelen et al. 1990 and 1996).
A demand shock increases output in Norway initially as expected, but after a few years, the positive
effect dies out as the zero long run restriction bites. A supply shock has a positive permanent effect on
manufacturing output. Initially, a unit supply shock increases manufacturing output with 1 pct., but
after two years, the effect of a unit shock has stabilised, and manufacturing output has increased by
more than 1.5 pct.
In figure 2, an energy volume shock increases the GDP deflator with almost 0.5 pct. for about a year,
after which the effect quickly dies out. This is consistent with the Dutch disease where increased
demand and production in the economy push inflation and the price level upwards (at least
temporarily). A real oil price shock on the other hand, reduces prices with approximately 0.2 pct.
However, the standard error band is wide and eventually include zero, indicating that the effect is not
precisely estimated after some periods. The negative response of prices to an oil price shock may be
due to the fact that the Norwegian currency is a petrocurrency. A petrocurrency is a currency whose
value is influenced by the large part oil plays in that country’s balance of payments (cf. Rutherford
1992). For Norway whose oil sector is large, the oil price shocks in the 1970s typically led to
appreciations of the Norwegian currency. In addition, Norway experienced lower inflation rates than
most of her trading partner during the 1970s, and thus experienced a real exchange rate appreciation.
An increase in the real price of oil may therefore actually have worked to reduce the price level.
Similarly with the huge fall in oil prices in 1986, the Norwegian currency devaluated, thereby pushing
the price level upwards.
A unit demand shock increases prices permanently with more than 2 pct., whereas a supply shock (that
increase output permanently) reduces prices permanently with approximately 1 pct. The
overidentifying restrictions suggested by the AD/AS diagram, that demand shocks increase prices
permanently whereas supply shocks reduce prices permanently, are therefore supported in the model
for Norway.
In figure 3, energy booms reduce manufacturing output in UK in the long run as predicted by the Dutch
disease. After eight years, a unit energy volume shock has decreased manufacturing output with
approximately 0.5 pct. However, the first two years, the standard error bands include zero, indicating
that the effect may be positive or negative initially. A unit oil price shock decreases manufacturing
output with about 0.4 pct. after one year, and the effect is stabilised at this point.
The response of manufacturing output to aggregate demand and supply shocks, mirrors what we saw
for Norway. An aggregate demand shock has a positive impact on output, thereafter the effect  declines
steadily until it vanishes after two to three years. The long run effect of an aggregate supply shock is
positive, although the initial impact is much smaller than in Norway. However after four years,
manufacturing output has stabilised at a new equilibrium level, 2.5 pct. above its initial level.
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Figure 3. Cumulative impulse response function: United Kingdom Manufacturing Production
A) Energy Booms B) Real Oil Price Shock
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Figure 4. Cumulative impulse response function: United Kingdom price (GDP Deflator)
A) Energy Booms B) Real Oil Price Shock
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In figure 4, energy booms increase the GDP deflator in UK. The effect of an energy boom on prices
seems to stabilise around 0.4 pct. after four years. A real oil price shock also increases prices. The
effect is largest the first year, where prices have increased with 0.3 pct. Thereafter the effect eventually
dies out, and the standard deviation bands include zero after two years. Hence, following an energy
boom, prices respond according to the Dutch disease in UK (as in Norway), where the increased
activity in the oil sector eventually push the domestic price level upwards. The fact that the oil sector in
UK play a relatively small role in the country’s balance of payment, may explain why also the price
level increased following an oil price shock (whereas in Norway, prices fell as the currency may have
appreciated with the higher oil prices).
A unit demand shock increases prices permanently as expected, and after eight years, prices are more
than 1 pct. higher. A permanent positive supply shock reduces prices with almost 2.5 pct. after 8 years.
Hence, the overidentifying restrictions that positive demand shocks increase prices permanently
whereas supply shocks reduce prices permanently, are also supported in the model for UK12.
The variance decompositions for manufacturing output, inflation and prices are seen in table 2 and 3
for Norway and UK respectively (see Lütkepohl 1993, ch. 2.3.3, for the relevant formulas). Both
energy booms and oil price shocks are more important in explaining fluctuations in output, inflation
and prices in Norway than in UK, and after two years, the two energy shocks together explain more
than 12 pct. of the variance in manufacturing output in Norway, but only 5 pct. of the variance in
manufacturing in UK.
In Norway, about 5 pct. of the explained variance in manufacturing is accounted for by energy booms
at all horizons. Energy booms explain about 10 pct. of the variation in inflation, although the effect on
the price level is virtually zero. Oil price shocks explain more than 7 pct. of the variance in output, but
less than 5 pct. of the variation in inflation, and about 2 pct. of the variation in prices. The fact that
energy shocks have larger effects on inflation that on prices, emphasises how the volatility in prices are
more affected than the price level itself. Demand shocks are less important that supply shocks in
explaining variation in manufacturing output, whereas demand shocks explain most of the variation in
inflation and prices. The fact that demand shocks have less impact on output than on prices and
inflation, may indicate a relatively steep short run supply schedule in terms of a standard AD/AS
diagram, where wages and prices adjust quickly.
For UK, the negative effects of energy booms on manufacturing output become more important as the
horizon increases, although after six years the effect is still small, explaining less than 3 pct. of the
variance in manufacturing output. Energy booms have also small effects on inflation and prices, and
approximately 3 pct. of the variance in inflation is explained by energy booms. Oil price shocks explain
between 2 and 3 pct. of the variation in manufacturing output, and the effect is largest after two years.
The effect on inflation and prices of an oil price shock is also small, explaining between 3 and 4 pct. of
the variation the first two years.
In contrast to Norway, demand shocks are more important than supply shocks in explaining output
movements the first year in UK, but already after two years, supply movements dominate. The effect
on prices (and inflation) in UK are dominated by supply shocks (shocks with permanent effects on
output). Hence, in terms of the AD/AS diagram above, the short run supply schedule is relatively flat
with wages and prices slowly adjusting, implying important effects on output in the short run from
demand shocks, but less effects on the price level.
                                                     
12
 There is an additional overidentifying restriction that can be tested informally, namely that neither oil and gas extraction nor
real oil prices (which are both real variables) should be affected by aggregate demand disturbances in the long run. By
examination, the impulse response functions for both Norway and UK show that the effect of demand shocks on oil and gas
extraction and real oil prices are not different from zero after some years.
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Table 2. Variance Decomposition in Norway
Quarters ES-shock OP-shock AD-shock AS-shock
Manufacturing
1 5.8 4.5 32.4 57.4
4 5.5 7.7 14.9 72.0
8 5.3 7.2 7.9 79.6
16 5.1 7.2 3.8 83.9
32 4.9 7.3 1.9 85.9
Inflation
1 0.3 4.6 63.7 31.5
4 10.5 5.0 53.5 31.0
8 10.4 4.9 54.7 30.1
16 10.4 4.9 54.9 29.9
32 10.4 4.9 54.9 29.9
Price
1 0.3 4.6 63.7 31.5
4 1.3 2.5 67.5 28.7
8 0.6 2.3 73.8 23.3
16 0.4 2.2 77.8 19.6
32 0.3 2.2 79.5 18.0
Table 3. Variance Decomposition in United Kingdom
Quarters ES-shock OP-shock AD-shock AS-shock
Manufacturing
1 1.1 1.8 79.6 17.5
4 1.8 1.9 73.1 23.2
8 1.6 2.7 38.2 57.5
16 2.0 2.1 13.7 82.1
32 2.7 1.8 5.3 90.2
Inflation
1 0.1 1.6 3.3 95.0
4 3.3 2.9 10.5 83.2
8 3.2 2.6 15.4 78.8
16 3.4 2.6 16.1 77.9
32 3.4 2.6 16.1 77.9
Price
1 0.1 1.6 3.3 95.0
4 0.5 3.6 9.8 86.1
8 0.7 1.9 17.6 79.8
16 1.3 1.3 21.9 75.5
32 1.7 1.1 23.6 73.7
On the other hand, both Norway and UK may have experienced several structural breaks/regime shifts
that the models may not have captured appropriately. For instance, during the late 1970s and early
1980s, Norway pursued strict price and wage controls, which may have distorted the results reported
above. In UK, the 15 pct. increase in VAT on all taxable items in Howe’s June budget in 1979, may
neither have been captured appropriately by the model, (see Clements and Mizon 1991).
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To investigate the sensitivity of the results to these potential structural changes, I constructed a dummy
to account for the price controls in Norway (DN), and reestimated the model13. The sign and magnitude
of the shocks did not change much, except that now demand and supply shocks are almost equally
important in explaining output variation initially, but after a year, supply shocks dominate as in the
core model. Demand shocks are still the most important factor explaining the variation in price (and
inflation). To control for the VAT change in UK, I included a dummy for the third quarter of 1979
(DUK), and reestimated the model. The effects on manufacturing output did not change much, except
that initially, demand disturbances are somewhat less important. The largest change were on prices
(and inflation), where demand shocks became more important initially, although supply shocks are still
the most important factor behind the variation in prices in UK.
Finally, I also tried to leave out all the dummies in the models for Norway and UK, to investigate
whether the results are very sensitive to the outliers that was found initially. Overall, the sign and the
magnitude of the shocks were virtually unchanged, except for the oil price shocks, which had
somewhat less impact on both output and prices after four years in Norway, but somewhat more impact
on output and prices in UK at all horizons. However, the signs of the effects of oil price shocks were
unchanged. These results implies that although we have included dummies for the outliers in the series
for oil prices in both countries and a dummy in the equation for oil and gas extraction in Norway, the
results do not essentially change much whether we include these outliers or not14.
5.3. Dynamic Responses in the output-unemployment model
In figure 5-8 below, I show the impulse responses of energy booms and oil price shocks on manu-
facturing output and unemployment in Norway and UK, using the Y-U model. Note that the vertical
axis in the diagram for unemployment measure percentage change. The variance decompositions of all
the shocks on manufacturing output and unemployment are thereafter presented15.
The results from the Y-U model are consistent with the core model in Norway, as both energy booms
and oil price shocks have positive impacts on output in Norway. However, the effects of energy booms
now decline to zero after approximately three years. Energy booms reduce unemployment temporarily,
as demand for labour in the other sectors increase. Real oil price shocks on the other hand, increase
unemployment temporarily. This is consistent with Bjørnland (1996), where an adverse oil price shock
had positive effects on (non-oil) GDP but increased unemployment temporarily. This may suggest that
although the real oil price shock stimulates the economy to the extent that the labour supply and
employment increases (as it did in the public sector in Norway in the 1970s), some workers are laid off
in other (energy based) sectors, so that total unemployment rises temporarily. However, the effects of
both energy booms and oil price shocks on unemployment are small (and not significant).
In UK, energy booms have negative long run effects on output as in the core model, and again the
effect may be slightly positive the first year. Oil price shocks have also negative effects on output as in
the core model. Both energy booms and oil price shocks increase unemployment in UK. The effects of
energy booms is largest the first two years, when unemployment is increased by 0.1 percentage points.
The effects of oil price shocks on unemployment are actually negative the first year, but thereafter
                                                     
13
 The most important price and wage stops in Norway during the sample I’m investigating, are from September 1978 to
December 1979, and from August 1981 to December 1981 (see e.g. Bowitz and Cappelen 1994). I experienced with several
dummies to try to capture these price stops, but only the price stop from 1978-1979 turned out to be significant. Eventually, I
then  constructed a dummy that is 1 in 1978Q3 and 1979Q4, -1 in 1979Q4 and 1980Q1 and 0 otherwise (see appendix A for a
further description).
14
 The results using the different dummies (or none), can be obtained from the author on request.
15
 The impulse responses of manufacturing output to demand and supply shocks are not reported, as they are very similar to
those reported for the core model, although the magnitude may vary somewhat. As the focus is not on unemployment, the
impulse responses of unemployment to demand and supply shocks are neither reported. However, they are consistent with
those found in Bjørnland (1996), where demand shocks decreases unemployment (as a mirror response to output) and supply
shocks increases unemployment initially, but thereafter unemployment falls.
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unemployment increases before it eventually dies out. However as in Norway,  the effects of both
energy booms and oil price shocks on unemployment are small16.
The variance decompositions for Norway using the Y-U model indicate that the effects of both energy
volume shocks and energy booms are consistent with the core model, although both explain somewhat
less of the variation in manufacturing output than in the core model. Supply shocks are the most
important factor in explaining output movements after a year, although the first quarter, demand shocks
are more important than supply shocks. This is very similar to what I got in the core model, especially
when I included a price dummy to account for the price controls in the late 1970s. Supply shocks are
the most important factor in explaining unemployment fluctuations initially, but after a while demand
shocks become equally important. Only 3 pct. of the variation in unemployment is explained by energy
volume shocks after a year, whereas oil price shocks explain only 1-2 pct. of the unemployment
variation.
Figure 5. Impulse response functions: Norway Manufacturing Production
A) Energy Booms B) Real Oil Price Shock
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Figure 6. Impulse response functions: Norway Unemployment
A) Energy Booms B) Real Oil Price Shock
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For UK, the two energy shocks play the same role in the Y-U model as in the core model, although now
oil price shocks are somewhat more important in the long run. Demand shocks on the other hand, play
a less important role in the Y-U model than in the core model, and already after one year supply shocks
dominate. However, recall that the effect of demand shocks were also reduced somewhat in the core
model, when I included a dummy for the VAT change in 1979. Supply shocks are the most important
factors behind the variation in unemployment in UK the first year, but thereafter demand shocks
dominate, explaining more than 60 pct. of unemployment variation after two years. Energy booms
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 The reason that unemployment falls initially after an oil price shock, may be due to the fact that we have removed the mean
from unemployment in 1980, at the same time as the second oil price shock occurred. In a previous version of this paper, I
performed the analysis without removing the mean in unemployment in 1980, and found the effect of oil price shocks on
unemployment to be positive already after three quarters (although the effect was still small).
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explain about 4 pct. of the variation in unemployment after two years, whereas oil price shocks explain
almost 5 pct. of unemployment variation after two years (when oil prices have increased
unemployment).
To sum up, there is no evidence of a Dutch disease in Norway using either the output-inflation or the
output-unemployment model, and both energy booms and oil price increases stimulate the economy so
manufacturing production increases (at least temporarily). Real oil price shocks are the most important
(positive) contributors towards the variation in manufacturing output of the two energy shocks,
indicating that the value of the petroleum wealth is an important contributor towards the activity in the
mainland economy. Energy booms also reduce unemployment, although following a real oil price
shock, unemployment increases marginally. Although there is no evidence of a Dutch disease in terms
of a reduction in the real activity, prices on the other hand, behave more in line with the Dutch disease
hypothesis. An energy boom will typically increase prices, whereas following a real oil price shock,
prices fall, as the increase in oil prices have appreciated the Norwegian (petroleum) currency, thereby
working to reduce the price level.
Figure 7. Impulse response function: United Kingdom Manufacturing Production
A) Energy Booms B) Real Oil Price Shock
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Figure 8. Impulse response functions: United Kingdom Unemployment
A) Energy Booms B) Real Oil Price Shock
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For UK, there is evidence of a Dutch disease in the long run (six to eight years), although the economy
may respond positively to energy booms the first two years. However, the negative effect on
manufacturing is small, and most of the decline in manufacturing in UK, stem probably from factors
other than the North Sea oil. Oil price shocks (that increase oil prices) have also negative effects on
manufacturing output, and both energy booms and oil price shocks increase prices and unemployment
(at least temporarily).
The fact that in UK, manufacturing output decreased, whereas in Norway, manufacturing output
actually increased in response to energy volume and price shocks, emphasises how two countries that
are self sufficient with oil resources can react very differently to external energy shocks. Although the
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oil sector plays a much larger role in Norway than in UK, macroeconomic policy has also been
conducted very differently in light of the two major oil price shocks in Norway and UK. In Norway,
there were deliberate subsidies to maintain manufacturing output over the transitional period of North
Sea oil, and as a result, unemployment has remained much lower in this period. A similar benefit could
probably have been derived in UK, from direct investment of the oil revenues in industries. Instead,
with factory closures and rapidly increasing unemployment rates from 1979 in UK, much of the
revenues from the North Sea oil went into social security in addition to payment of already existing
external debts, (see e.g. the discussions in Mayes and Soteri 1994, pp. 383-386).
Table 4. Variance Decomposition in Norway
Quarters ES-shock OP-shock AD-shock AS-shock
Manufacturing
1 3.7 3.5 69.2 23.6
4 2.4 5.8 43.7 48.2
8 1.3 4.8 25.8 77.7
16 0.9 4.3 12.5 82.7
32 0.3 4.0  5.9 89.8
Unemployment
1 1.4 1.6 31.6 65.4
4 3.0 1.3 38.3 57.6
8 2.9 1.1 45.9 50.1
16 2.9 1.1 47.1 49.0
32 2.9 1.1 47.1 49.0
Table 5. Variance Decomposition in United Kingdom
Quarters ES-shock OP-shock AD-shock AS-shock
Manufacturing
1 0.9 2.1 47.3 49.7
4 1.6 3.0 26.9 68.5
8 2.9 5.1 16.3 75.7
16 3.1 5.7 8.5 82.7
32 2.3 6.1 4.5 87.1
Unemployment
1 1.7 0.0 38.7 59.6
4 2.7 6.5 47.9 42.9
8 4.2 4.7 65.7 25.4
16 6.4 4.1 66.3 23.2
32 6.6 4.2 65.8 23.5
How do these findings correspond to previous empirical studies of the Dutch disease?17 The results for
Norway are consistent with simulation studies in Bye et al. (1994) and Cappelen et al. (1996). Bye et
al. (1994) find a positive effect on manufacturing production and employment from energy booms
(measured by increases in investment or intermediate input in the energy sector), even in the long run
(after 7 years). They also find unemployment to have fallen in response to energy booms, and prices to
have risen marginally. This is also supported in Cappelen et al. (1996), although they show in addition
that whereas the sheltered industries have increased production over the sample (1973-1993), some
export competing industries eventually loose out. Hutchison (1994), also finds positive effects of
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 Generally, there are some problems in comparing the results from the VAR model with these simulation studies, as the
results in the simulation studies will vary with the specifications of the models (as with all empirical studies). Especially, the
effect of a Dutch disease is often measured by comparing the historical path (the economy with the oil sector) with the
economy without the oil sector, and will thus depend on the assumptions about the appropriate policies and actions when there
are no oil sector.
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energy booms on manufacturing output, at least in the medium term (1-3 years). He further shows that
oil price shocks increase manufacturing output with about 0.3 pct. the first two years18.
The deflationary (but small) effects on manufacturing output in UK of the oil and gas discoveries,
supports the early findings in Forsyth and Key (1980), who using a simple quantification method, was
one of the first studies of the Dutch disease in UK to find a negative effect on manufacturing output
from energy production. Bruno and Sachs (1982) using a dynamic perfect foresight equilibrium model,
also find effects of the Dutch disease in UK. The size of this effect typically depends on the
government budget policies concerning the redistribution of oil tax revenues to the private sector.
However, as the authors themselves emphasise, the model is not accurately parameterized and may
therefore not depict the behavioural relationship in UK exactly.
On the other hand, Atkinson et al. (1983) and Bean (1987), find no negative effects from energy
production on manufacturing, and in some cases manufacturing output has actually increased.
Hutchison (1994) also finds energy booms to have positive effects on manufacturing in UK in the short
to medium term (he does not report any effects after 4-5 years). These results essentially come from the
cointegration restrictions he has imposed, but for UK he finds three cointegration vectors, so the point
estimates of the cointegrating vectors may not be directly interpretable without further identifying
assumptions. Note, however, that the fact that there may be short term positive effects on
manufacturing production from energy discoveries during a transition period, could be supported in the
findings above, (cf. figure 3 and 7), although in the long run, the effects were negative. On the other
hand, the sample used in Atkinson et al. (1983), Bean (1987) and Hutchison (1994), ended in the
middle 1980s, when UK’s oil production was at its peak19. As seen in table 1, oil production in UK has
declined steadily since then, and as expected by the Dutch disease hypothesis, it is first now we will
see the symptom of the Dutch disease. Finally, the fact that oil price shocks reduce manufacturing
output is widely supported in studies analysing the effects of oil prices on the British economy, (e.g.
Bruno and Sachs 1982, Bean 1987, Hutchison 1994, and Bjørnland 1996)20.
6. Sources of business cycles implied by the VAR model
Until now, I have discussed the responses of manufacturing to the different shocks on average over the
whole period. In the remaining part, I focus instead on short term fluctuations in each historical period.
This will give us an idea of which shocks are the most important in the different time periods. To focus
on specific historical periods, I compute the forecast errors in output. That is, output is decomposed
according to (3), using an (eight quarter) weighted average of the estimated shocks, with the weights
given by the impulse responses. The decomposition is based on the following partition (cf. Lütkepohl
1993, ch. 2.3.3):
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 However, Hutchison (1994) is imprecise in some of his statements, as he argues that «the estimated cointegrating
vectors...act as long-run constraints on the system dynamics», (see Hutchison, 1994, p.322). This is misleading, as the
cointegrating vectors only tell us something about the covariation between the individual time series, and do not act as
constraints on the system in the sense the identifying (long run) restrictions used here do. The LR response of  industrial
production from energy booms can therefore not be found by interpreting the cointegrating vectors alone. This is clearly
illustrated for Norway, where, although the (normalised) cointegrating vector has a positive coefficient between energy booms
and industrial production, (see Hutchison, 1994, table 4), the impulse response of manufacturing output to energy booms is
both positive and negative the first five years (after which the response is not reported), (see Hutchison, 1994, figure 1).
19
 The sample in Hutchison (1994) ended in 1989.
20
 Bean (1987) shows that the effects of the two oil price shocks in the 1970s together with the oil and gas discoveries, work to
depress the economy so manufacturing output decreases and unemployment increases.
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The first sum represents the part of zt+j that is due to innovations in period t+1 to t+j. The second sum is
the dynamic forecast (base projection) of zt+j, based on information given at time t. The gap between
each data series and its base projection, can be assessed in terms of the contributions of the innovations
of each series in the analysis (the forecast error). The results are presented in figure 9 and 10 for
Norway and UK respectively. In panel A-C in each figure, I plot the total forecast error in output
together with the forecast error that is due to energy booms, oil price shocks and demand shocks
respectively. As the variables are in logarithms, these plots can be interpreted as pct. deviation from a
«trend». In panel D, the log of manufacturing output is graphed together with the forecast error in
manufacturing output that is associated with the supply shock when the drift term in the model is
added, I will refer to this as the supply potential21.
Above we have seen that although the responses of manufacturing in the output-inflation and the
output-unemployment models are consistent with regard to the sign of the different shocks, they differ
somewhat with respect to the magnitude of the shocks, at least for demand and supply shocks. As the
demand and supply shocks are aggregate shocks, they will typically vary somewhat when identified
using two different models. Especially, the demand and supply shocks identified in the core and the
Y-U model may not be exactly the same in the short run, especially if there are structural/regime
changes, like the price controls or VAT changes discussed above. As unemployment seems to be a
more «unregulated» cyclical variable than inflation, I continue the analysis using the Y-U model.
However, the main results are basically the same using either of the two models, although the
magnitude of the shocks will differ somewhat in some periods. For comparison, I have graphed the
forecast error in manufacturing output due to energy booms and oil price shocks using the core model
in appendix D.
To organise the discussion, I divide the sample in Norway into four sub periods, which corresponds
approximately to the start and end of two booms and two recessions in the mainland economy (cf.
Bjørnland 1995, 1996, and Cappelen et al. 1996). From 1979 to 1981, the economy is booming,
thereafter follows a recession from 1982 to 1984, before the economy is again booming in 1985-1987.
From 1988 to (1990) 1993, follows a new recession (and a start of a recovery).
1979-1981 Positive energy booms (from increased extractions of oil and gas resources) and higher oil
prices due to the adverse oil price shocks, were important contributors towards the boom in
manufacturing output in this period. Demand shocks were also positive, as the government pursued
accommodating policies in this period. However, the boom in manufacturing is short lived, and from
1981, negative supply shocks hit the economy. This can be seen in figure 9.D, where both
manufacturing and the supply potential are on a downward trend from 1981, probably due to a loss of
competitiveness.
1982-1984 Energy production is declining in this period, and reaches a trough in 1982 (cf. figure A.1.
in appendix A). The negative stimulus from the fall in activity in the energy sector can be seen by a
series of negative energy shocks in this period. Oil price shocks play virtually no role in this recession.
However, the main contributor later in this recession, is a series of negative demand shocks. The
recession is short-lived, which can be seen in figure 9.D, where manufacturing falls below the supply
potential only for a short period.
1985-1987 From 1985, the mainland economy in Norway is stimulated from a demand led boom, set
off primarily by the financial deregulation in 1984/1985 (see e.g. Bjørnland 1996). The boom in
manufacturing in this period is also mainly demand driven, although he supply potential is also
increasing. The increase in the supply potential may be due to a series of permanent shocks in the mid
1980s, among other the large investments in the Mognstad refinery. Energy booms are almost
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 Note that, the total forecast error in manufacturing output reported in panel A-C also include the contribution of  the
aggregate supply shocks (without the drift term) in addition to the three other shocks.
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negligible in this period, although using the output-inflation model, energy booms are somewhat more
emphasised as positive contributors in this boom (see figure D.1.A in appendix D). From 1986, the fall
in oil prices contribute negatively to manufacturing production, and from 1987, the economy slows
down.
Figure 9. Forecast error decompositions for Manufacturing production in Norway
A) Energy boom component, pct. change B) Oil price component, pct. change
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C) Aggregate demand component, pct. change D) Manufacturing and aggregate supply,
(drift term added)
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1988-(1990) 1993 From 1988 to 1990, manufacturing falls drastically. This is driven by an equal
severe decline in the supply potential, as a series of negative productivity shocks (accumulating in
several shut downs of firms) hit the economy. Demand shocks eventually become negative in this
period, but the recession is by far dominated by the negative supply shocks (this is robust using either
the output-inflation or the output-unemployment model). The timing of the downwards shift in
manufacturing output, corresponds well with the timing of the break upwards in the unemployment rate
in 1988Q2 (cf. section 5.1). Energy booms contribute positively during this period, but the effect is
very small.
 The economy is improving somewhat by 1990, but from 1991, manufacturing output falls again. This
time, negative demand shocks (from low international demand) and negative oil prices shocks (from a
low oil price) trigger off the recession (again, this is robust using either of the two models, see figure
D.1.A in appendix D). From 1993, the economy is improving, with both positive demand and supply
shocks hitting the economy.
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To sum up, whereas energy booms contribute positively towards the 1979-1981 boom and negatively
towards the 1982-1984 recession, they play only small but positive roles in the 1985-1987 boom and
the 1988 - (1990) 1993 recession. Oil price shocks are also contributing positively towards the boom in
the late 1970s, but in contrast to energy volume shocks, oil price shocks are large negative contributors
towards the recession from 1988, (as low oil prices erodes the economy of income).
Until now, I have analysed the effects of energy booms as volume shocks to energy production. As
discussed in section four, these booms may have both direct and indirect effects on the economy. The
most important direct effects from an energy boom, take the form of increased demand for investment
and labour in the energy sector. For Norway, where approximately 20 pct. of GDP are oil and gas
extractions, demand effects from the petroleum sector may be important contributors towards the
mainland activity. In Cappelen et al. (1996), the effects of energy booms on the cycles in Norway are
measured by (among other) comparing a smooth path for (accrued) investment in the petroleum sector,
with actual investment22. Generally, they find these energy booms to contribute positively with
approximately 20 pct., towards the cycles in manufacturing (value added). Especially, they show the
recession in 1980-1984 and the boom in 1985-1987 to be highly influenced by the activity in the energy
sector, although, consistent with the findings above, energy booms play no role in the recession in the
late 1980s (see Cappelen et al. 1996, pp. 71-74).
To compare these findings with mine, I perform a final exercise for Norway, where I replace extraction
of oil and gas, (s), with accrued investments, (i), in the VAR model23. Generally, I find the results from
above to be virtually unchanged, and no more than 5 pct. of the explained variation in manufacturing
output is accounted for by energy booms using either the core or the Y-U model. However, when the
effect of the shocks are analysed in each time period, I find somewhat more support for the positive
contribution of energy booms also in the period 1983-1986 (see figure D.2. in appendix D), indicating
that the direct demand effects from increased investment in platforms etc., contribute positively
towards the boom in manufacturing industry also in the mid 1980s. However, oil price shocks are still
more important contributors than energy booms over the sample, especially in accounting for the
recession in the late 1980s. Hence, the direct demand effects from changes in investment in platforms
on manufacturing are larger in Cappelen et al. (1996), than what I could find here using an estimated
VAR model. On the other hand, as they have not separated out the effects of oil price shocks from
energy booms, they may have underestimated the wealth effects following changes in the oil price, on
the activity in the manufacturing sector.
The results for UK are seen in figure 10. Again I organise the discussion around four periods, which
have characterised the mainland economy; The economy is at a peak in June 1979, thereafter follows a
recession in 1980-1983, a recovery in 1984-1986, a boom in 1987-1990, and a recession in 1991-1994
(see e.g. Artis et al. 1995 and Bjørnland 1996)24.
1979-1983; When the Thatcher government took over in 1979, on of its primary aims was to reduce
inflation by tight monetary control. From 1979/1980, the new government announced severe monetary
policy tightening, and public expenditure cuts. The economy started to drop from the end of 1979, and
with further fiscal tightening from 1981, the effects on the economy were huge. Output fell drastically,
especially manufacturing output which decreased by more than 15 pct. during 1980, and unemployment
rose by more than 1 million in a year.
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 Production in the energy sector will depend on capital in that sector, so the activity is fully supply side determined. By
determining the level of investment, the capital in the energy sector will also be determined, hence demand for labour and
production will be decided.
23
 See appendix A for definitions and a plot of the series. Three lags and the two dummies DD86Q1 and D90Q3 are used in the
model to be consistent with the core model. A test for cointegration confirms that the system is not cointegrating.
24
 Artis et al. (1995) dates peaks (preceded by recovery) and troughs (preceded by recession) in industrial production in UK.
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The effects of these shocks on manufacturing can clearly be seen in figure 10. Adverse supply shocks
contribute mostly to the decline in manufacturing output, by shifting down the supply potential (cf.
figure 10.D). These negative permanent «supply shocks» have had long lasting negative effects on the
economy, and may indicate a loss of competitiveness through a longer term negative trend (see e.g.
Flemming 1982, Buiter and Miller 1983 and Mayes and Soteri 1994, for similar arguments). The
timing of this downwards shift in output, corresponds well with the timing of the break upwards in the
unemployment rate in 1980Q2 (cf. section 5). However, the results reported here are robust using also
the output-inflation model.
Energy booms are also negative early in this period, as energy production is taken out at a very high
speed (cf. figure A.2. appendix A). However as seen in figure 10A, they play only a small role
compared to the negative supply shocks that hit the economy from 1980. Higher oil prices due to the
adverse oil price shocks from 1980, are also negative contributors in this recession, (see also figure
D.1.B in appendix D).
Figure 10. Forecast error decompositions for Manufacturing production in United Kingdom
A) Energy boom component, pct. change B) Oil price component, pct. change
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1984-1986; By 1984, the economy starts to recover. Positive supply shocks (from increased
productivity growth) drive the «supply potential» above manufacturing output. However, demand is
still slow, and by 1986, the supply potential shifts down again and the economy contracts. Energy
booms and oil price shocks play virtually no role in this mid 1980s «recovery» period.
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1987-1990; During this period, manufacturing is booming, driven primarily by positive demand
shocks, but the fall in oil prices is also a positive contributor towards manufacturing production early in
this period. The «supply potential» behaves like a stable (linear) trend from now on (cf. figure 10.D).
1991-1994; From 1990/1991 manufacturing slows down again, primarily due to a series of negative
demand shocks as the international economy is slowing down. However, by the end of this period, the
economy starts to recover somewhat with positive demand shocks hitting British manufacturing.
Hence, in contrast to Norway, energy booms play little role in short term movements in UK, which is
not surprising, as the effects of energy booms are largest in the long run (cf. table 3 and 5). However,
the main contributors towards the observed decline in manufacturing, are the negative supply shocks
that hit the economy from 1980 and periods of low demand in several periods in the 1980s.
7. Conclusions
There is no evidence of a Dutch disease in Norway, and both energy booms and oil price increases
stimulate the economy so manufacturing production increases. Real oil price shocks are the most
important (positive) contributor towards the variation in manufacturing output of the two energy
shocks, indicating that the value of the petroleum wealth is an important contributor towards the
activity in the mainland economy. Prices on the other hand, respond according to the Dutch disease in
Norway, as energy booms increase prices (as activity increases), whereas a real oil price shock reduces
prices, as the Norwegian currency appreciates with a high price of oil.
When the impacts of the shocks are analysed in different time periods, energy booms contribute
positively towards the 1979-1981 boom and negatively towards the 1982-1984 recession, but play only
small roles from the middle 1980s. Oil price shocks also contribute positively towards the boom in the
late 1970s, but in contrast to energy volume shocks, they are large negative contributors towards the
recession from 1988, (as low oil prices erodes the economy of income).
There is weak evidence of a Dutch disease in the long run in UK, but energy booms play a little role in
the short term movements in UK. However, the (long run) negative effect on manufacturing is small,
and most of the decline in manufacturing in UK, stem probably from factors other than the North Sea
oil. Oil price shocks have also negative effects on manufacturing output in UK.
Demand and supply shocks have the effects as suggested by economic theory in both countries. A
demand shock increases output and reduces unemployment temporary, whereas prices increase
permanently. Following a supply shock, output increases and prices fall permanently. Supply shocks
are the most important contributors towards the variation in manufacturing output (after a year) in both
countries, and the severe recessions in the early 1980s in UK and the late 1980s in Norway, are mainly
driven by negative supply shocks.
Finally, note that the limited number of variables and the aggregate nature of the shocks, implies that
the estimated VAR model should be regarded as an approximation to a larger structural system. Some
insight is also lost by treating manufacturing as an aggregate. Although I find manufacturing output in
Norway to be benefited from the North Sea oil, the heterogeneity of the manufacturing sector implies
that I do not know whether new industries geared towards the oil sector may have been created, at the
expense of some of the traditional export oriented industries, (this was supported in Cappelen et al.
1996). In a different study, Klette and Mathiassen (1996) show that the manufacturing sector in
Norway is in fact very flexible, and on average (1976-1986), 8.4 pct. of the jobs in the manufacturing
industry was destructed each year, whereas 7.1 pct. of manufacturing employment was created each
year.
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Appendix A. Data sources and descriptions
All series are seasonally adjusted quarterly data, unless otherwise stated. The series are seasonally
adjusted by their respective sources. The periodicity is from 1976Q1 to 1994Q3. All variables are
measured in natural logarithms, except the unemployment rate.
Norway:
(y) GDP Manufacturing sector. Source: Statistics Norway
(s) GDP Oil and gas extraction. Source: Statistics Norway
(p) GDP deflator mainland Norway. Source: Statistics Norway
(o) Real oil prices measured in Norwegian kroner; Nominal oil prices in U.S. dollars per barrel,
converted to Norwegian kroner and deflated by the consumer price index in Norway;
Nominal Oil price: Saudi Arabian Light-34, USD per barrel, fob- (n.s.a.). Prior to 1980, posted
prices, thereafter spot prices. Source: OPEC BULLETIN and Statistics Norway
Exchange rate, mth. avg. NOK/USD, (n.s.a.). Source OECD.
Consumer Price Index. Source: Statistics Norway
(u) Unemployment rate. Source: Statistics Norway
(i) Accrued investments in the petroleum sector (investment in the petroleum sector plus the change
in the stock of platforms in progress). Source: Statistics Norway
(D86q1) Impulse dummy, 1 in 1986Q1, 0 otherwise
(D90q3) Impulse dummy, 1 in 1990Q3, 0 otherwise
(DD77Q4) Impulse dummy, 1 in 1977Q4-1978Q1, 0 otherwise
(DN) Composite dummy, 1 in 1978Q3, 1978Q4, -1 in 1979Q4, 1980Q1, 0 otherwise
United Kingdom:
(y) Industrial production: Manufacturing, (quarterly average from monthly averages), index
1990=100. Source: Datastream
(s) Industrial production: Oil and gas extraction, (quarterly average from monthly averages), index
1990=100. Source: Datastream
(p) GDP deflator. Source: Datastream
(o) Real oil prices measured in GBP; Nominal oil prices in U.S. dollars, converted to GBP and
deflated by the consumer price index;
Nominal Oil price: (See above)
Exchange rate, mth. average GBP/USD, (n.s.a.). Source OECD.
Consumer Price Index. Source: Datastream
(u) Unemployment rate, total labour force. Source: OECD
(D86q1) Impulse dummy, 1 in 1986Q1, 0 otherwise
(D90q3) Impulse dummy, 1 in 1990Q3, 0 otherwise
(DUK) Impulse dummy, 1 in 1979Q3, 0 otherwise
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Figure A.1. Norway: Oil and Gas extractions (logarithms)
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Figure A.2. Norway: Accrued Investment (logarithms)
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Figure A.3. UK: Oil and Gas extractions (logarithms)
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Appendix B. Model specifications - Determination of lag order and
misspecification tests
Table B.1. Norway: Information criteria and F-tests for model reductions (core model)a
Lags SC HQ Sequential F-tests p-value Direct F-tests p-value
8 -21.75 -24.61
7 -22.15 -24.70 F(16,   86) = 1.16 0.313 F(16,    86) = 1.16 0.313
6 -22.87 -25.10 F(16,   98) = 0.60 0.874 F(32,  104) = 0.89 0.641
5 -23.34 -25.25 F(16, 110) = 1.32 0.198 F(48,  109) = 1.02 0.458
4 -23.95 -25.54 F(16, 122) = 1.07 0.394 F(64,  111) = 1.03 0.437
3 -24.35 -25.62 F(16, 135) = 1.84 0.032 F(80,  112) = 1.19 0.193
2 -24.62 -25.57 F(16, 147) = 2.51 0.002 F(96,  113) = 1.44 0.032
1 -25.62 -25.65 F(16, 159) = 2.20 0.007 F(112,113) = 1.61 0.006
a) SC reports the Schwarz information criteria, HQ reports the Hannan-Quinn information criteria, sequential F-test with
corresponding p-value reports the sequential model reductions (8→7,...,2→1 lags), direct F-test with corresponding p-value
reports the direct model reductions (8→7, ..., 8→1 lags). All test-statistics are calculated using PcFiml 8.0 (see Doornik and
Hendry 1994).
Table B.2. United Kingdom: Information criteria and F-tests for model reductions (core model)a
Lags SC HQ Sequential F-tests p-value Direct F-tests p-value
8 -22.78 -25.59
7 -23.38 -25.87 F(16,   86) = 0.79 0.691 F(16,    86) = 0.79 0.691
6 -23.41 -25.57 F(16,   98) = 2.34 0.006 F(32,  104) = 1.52 0.060
5 -23.98 -25.82 F(16, 110) = 1.08 0.382 F(48,  109) = 1.41 0.072
4 -24.50 -26.03 F(16, 122) = 1.35 0.181 F(64,  111) = 1.43 0.049
3 -25.18 -26.39 F(16, 135) = 0.98 0.485 F(80,  112) = 1.37 0.062
2 -25.66 -26.54 F(16, 147) = 1.78 0.039 F(96,  113) = 1.48 0.023
1 -26.00 -26.56 F(16, 159) = 2.45 0.003 F(112,113) = 1.69 0.003
a) For a description of the tests, see table B.1
Table B.3. Misspecification tests, Norway a
A. Single equations
Test Statistic ∆y ∆o ∆s π (=∆p)
AR 1-5b F(5,50) 1.57
[0.19]
2.10
[0.08]
1.14
[0.35]
0.42
[0.83]
ARCH 4c F(4,47)] 1.06
[0.39]
0.24
[0.91]
0.48
[0.75]
0.31
[0.87]
White-Het.d F(24,30) 1.14
[0.37]
1.18
[0.33]
0.96
[0.54]
1.62
[0.10]
Normality e X2 (2) 1.54
[0.46]
2.80
[0.25]
1.78
[0.41]
1.75
[0.42]
a) The number in brackets are the p-values of the test statistics. All statistics have been calculated using
PcFiml 8.0 (see Doornik and Hendry 1994).
b) LM test for residual autocorrelation of order 5
c) LM test for 4th order ARCH in the residuals
d) Test for residual heteroscedastisity due to White (1980)
e) Test of normality due to Shenton and Bowman (1977), see Doornik and Hansen (1994) for a description.
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B. VAR system (core model)a
Test Statistic VAR
AR 1-5b F(80,128) 1.37
[0.06]
White-Het.c F(240,219) 1.12
[0.19]
Normalityd X2 (8) 6.12
[0.63]
a) The number in brackets are the p-values of the test statistics.
All statistics have been calculated using PcFiml 8.0 (see Doornik and Hendry 1994).
b) LM test for residual autocorrelation of order 5
c) Test for residual heteroscedastisity due to White (1980)
d) Test of normality due to Shenton and Bowman (1977), see Doornik and Hansen (1994) for a description.
Table B.4. Misspecification tests, United Kingdoma
A) Single equations
Test Statistic ∆y ∆o ∆s π (=∆p)
AR 1-5 F(5,46) 1.20
[0.32]
0.88
[0.50]
0.14
[0.98]
2.42
[0.05]
ARCH 4 F(4,43) 1.39
[0.25]
0.24
[0.91]
2.01
[0.11]
0.14
[0.97]
White-Het. F(32,18) 0.55
[0.93]
0.80
[0.72]
0.85
[0.67]
0.88
[0.63]
Normality X2 (2) 3.45
[0.18]
0.45
[0.80]
2.66
[0.26]
3.01
[0.22]
a) For a description of the tests, see table B.3.A
B) VAR system (core model)a
Test Statistic VAR
AR 1-5 F(80,112) 1.59
[0.02]
White-Het. F(320,113) 0.48
[1.00]
Normality X2 (8) 12.20
[0.14]
a) For a description of the tests, see table B.3.B
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Appendix C. Test for unit roots and cointegration
Table C.1. Augmented Dickey Fuller unit-root tests (1978:2-1994:3)a
t-ADF test Norway ADF-test United Kingdom
y ADF(2) -2.44 ADF(2) -2.31
o ADF(3) -2.65 ADF(3) -2.71
s ADF(7) -2.98 ADF(3) -2.95
p ADF(3) -0.33 ADF(2) -1.92
∆y ADF(3) -4.82*** ADF(1) -3.38**
∆o ADF(2) -4.05*** ADF(1) -7.58***
∆s ADF(6) -3.62*** ADF(4) -2.81*
π (=∆p) ADF(2) -2.91** ADF(1) -3.02**
a) The critical values for the full sample Augmented Dickey Fuller statistic was taken from Fuller (1976) table 8.5.2 p 373. A
time trend and a constant are included in the regression of the level of y, o, s and p, whereas in the regression using first
differences, a constant (but no time trend) is included in the regression. The number of lags used in the ADF tests are
determined by selecting the highest lag with a significant t value on the last lag, as suggested by Doornik and Hendry (1994).
*** Rejection of the unit-root hypothesis at the 1%  level
** Rejection of the unit-root hypothesis at the 5%  level
* Rejection of the unit-root hypothesis at the 10%  level
Table C.2. Johansen cointegration tests (core model)a
Cointegrating vector (yt, ot, st, πt)
H0 H1
critical
value
5 %
critical
value
5 %
Norway UK
λmax λtrace λmax λtrace λmax λtrace
r=0 r≥1 27.07 47.21 24.50 42.78 23.34 46.84
r≤1 r≥2 20.97 29.68 10.69 18.28 14.22 23.49
r≤2 r≥3 14.07 15.41 5.09 7.59 9.02 9.27
r≤3 r=4 3.76 3.76 2.51 2.51 0.25 0.25
a) All test-statistics are calculated using PcFiml 8.0 (see Doornik and Hendry 1994).
Critical values are taken from Table 1 in Osterwald-Lenum (1992).
Table C.3. Johansen cointegration tests (output-unemployment model)a
Cointegrating vector (yt, ot, st, ut)b
H0 H1
critical
value
5 %
critical
value
5 %
Norway UK
λmax λtrace λmax λtrace λmax λtrace
r=0 r≥1 27.07 47.21 19.83 35.14 20.81 41.19
r≤1 r≥2 20.97 29.68  9.38 15.31  13.50 20.39
r≤2 r≥3 14.07 15.41 4.17 5.93  6.88 6.88
r≤3 r=4 3.76 3.76 1.77 1.77 0.00 0.00
a) All test-statistics are calculated using PcFiml 8.0 (see Doornik and Hendry 1994).
Critical values are taken from Table 1 in Osterwald-Lenum (1992).
b) ut refers to unemployment adjusted for the structural break (cf. section 5.1).
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Appendix D. Forecast error decompositions for Manufacturing
output
Figure D.1. Output-inflation model. Energy booms and oil price component; pct. change
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Figure D.2. Norway; Output-inflation model, energy booms identified from accrued investment.
Energy booms and oil price component; pct. changea
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
81:4   82:4   83:4  84:4  85:4  86:4  87:4  88:4  89:4  90:4  91:4  92:4  93:4  
OP
ES
a) The sample used to estimate runs from 1979 to 1994
